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Abstract 
An assumption/guarantee specification of a system consists of an assumption part, which spec- 
ifies the assumptions on the behavior of the environment, and a guarantee part, which specifies 
the properties guaranteed by the system if the environment obeys the assumptions. A suitable 
interpretation of an assumption/guarantee specification was essentially formulated by Misra and 
Chandy (1981). The interpretation was later extended by others to allow liveness properties in 
the guarantee part. 
In this paper, we explore the use of linear-time temporal logic in writing and reasoning about 
assumption/guarantee specifications. We choose this logic, specifically LTL defined in the book 
by Manna and Pnueli (1992), for the following reasons: 
(i) Linear-time temporal logics, including LTL and TLA, have proven to be a successful 
formalism for the specification and verification of concurrent systems. 
(ii) Previous works on assumption/guarantee specifications typically reason about relevant 
properties at the semantic level or define a special-purpose logic. We feel it is beneficial to 
formulate such specifications in a more widely used formalism. 
(iii) We find that, with past temporal operators, LTL admits a succinct syntactic formulation 
of assumption/guarantee specifications. This contrasts, in particular, with the work by Abadi and 
Lamport using TLA, where working at the syntactic level is more complicated. 
We derive inference rules for refining and composing assumption/guarantee specifications as 
the main results of this paper. The derived rules can handle internal variables. We had to 
overcome a number of technical problems in this pursuit, in particular, the problem of extracting 
the safety closure of a temporal formula. As a by-product, we identify general conditions under 
which the safety closure can be expressed in a succinct way that facilitates syntactic manipulation. 
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1. Introduction 
The modular and hierarchical design of concurrent systems requires a method for 
refining and composing specifications at different levels of abstraction. The system un- 
der consideration may be closed or open. A closed system is one that is self-contained; 
it may be observed by, but does not interact with, its environment. An open system, 
in contrast, executes in parallel and may interact with its environment. Closed sys- 
tems can be considered as a special kind of open systems that do not interact with 
their environments (on the other hand, an open system may also be modeled as a 
closed system by assuming inputs from the environment as being generated nondeter- 
ministically by the system itself). A large open system may consist of a number of 
smaller modules. Each module of the system is also an open system whose environ- 
ment is the composition of all other modules and the environment of the entire open 
system. 
The specification of an open system can be unconditional, giving a complete 
description of a particular implementation (to an extreme, the code) of the system in 
any possible environment. Unconditional specifications are usually detailed and serve 
best at the lowest level of abstraction. Most of the time throughout a design, one often 
needs to specify and reason about the behavior of a module under certain assump- 
tions about its environment. A conditional, or assumption/guarantee, specification of 
an open system specifies the assumptions on the behavior of the environment and the 
properties guaranteed by the system if the environment obeys the assumptions. 
In this paper, we explore the use of linear-time temporal logic in writing and rea- 
soning about assumption/guarantee (A/G for brevity) specifications. The idea of repre- 
senting concurrent systems (programs) and their specifications as formulae in temporal 
logic was first proposed by Pnueli [ 151. Lamport later observed that if specifications are 
invariant under stuttering, then refinement between specifications can be represented by 
the usual implication in temporal logic [l 11. A further advance towards the effective 
use of temporal logic for the specification of concurrent systems was to notice that 
hidden, or internal, variables can be represented by existential quantification over pro- 
gram variables [12, 161. We intend to make a further contribution in the same vein by 
showing that A/G specifications can be formulated entirely within linear-time temporal 
logic. Barringer and Kuiper [6] are, to our knowledge, the first to formulate A/G spec- 
ifications in temporal logic; however, their formulation does not allow quantification 
over program variables. 
Suppose we wish to specify that the behavior of a system satisfies a guarantee 
property M if the behavior of its environment satisfies an assumption property E. An 
obvious formulation would be the usual implication E + M. But, this formulation has 
a problem, for example, when we compose two systems - one satisfying E + M and 
the other satisfying M + E. If E and M are safety properties (stating that “bad things” 
do not happen [5]), we naturally would expect that the composed system satisfies both 
E and M. However, we cannot come to this conclusion, since it is not possible to 
discharge any of the antecedents in the implications. 
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A solution to the preceding problem was originally proposed by Misra and Chandy 
[14]. The basic idea is that a system satisfies an A/G specification with assumption 
E and guarantee A4 if, in every state of an execution, the system guarantees A4 up 
to the current state provided that its environment has respected E up to the preceding 
state; the definition implies that A4 is satisfied in the first (initial) state. If both E and 
M are safety properties, then the circular reasoning encountered when composing two 
systems can be broken by induction on the length of executions. Misra and Chandy’s 
formulation has been elaborated and extended in various contexts, e.g., [6,9,24,8]. In 
particular, Abadi and Lamport [3] combine the formulation with the usual implication 
so that the guarantee part may contain liveness properties (stating that “good things” 
eventually happen [5]). ’ 
We propose to formulate A/G specifications using the linear-time temporal logic 
(LTL for brevity) of Manna and Pnueli [ 131 that conform to the aforementioned inter- 
pretation. Previous works on A/G specifications, including [ 14,7-10,2-4, 171, typically 
reason about relevant properties at the semantic level or define a special-purpose logic. 
In contrast, our definition of an A/G specification is syntactic and entirely within 
LTL, 3 which is relatively well understood and widely applied. We derive inference 
rules for refining and composing A/G specifications as the main results of the paper. 
The derivations are quite straightforward in the adopted logic. 
One important aspect of our formulation is being able to handle assumptions and 
guarantees with internal variables, which simply are existentially quantified variables 
in LTL. Internal variables can be very useful in shortening a specification, e.g., the 
specification of a queue. Abadi and Lamport’s work [3] is most closely related to 
ours. Gronning et al. [9] have also considered internal variables, but in a semantic 
framework. In addition, their proof rules seem unnecessarily strong and are formu- 
lated indirectly in terms of simulations rather than directly in terms of computations. 
Recently, Collette [8] designed a UNITY-like logic for A/G specifications (with 
restricted forms of assumptions and guarantees) that can handle hiding. 
The work of Abadi and Lamport [3] in using TLA [12] for A/G specifications has 
been one inspiration of our work. Although they have also used temporal logic as the 
basis, their approach is different from ours. Whereas we try to express and reason about 
A/G specifications syntactically, they work mostly at the semantic level (because, for 
A/G specifications, working at the syntactic level of TLA would be very complicated). 
In particular, they introduce an operator a, which is defined semantically (though a 
2 Abadi and Lamport’s formulation of an A/G specification also allows liveness properties in the assumption 
part. However, their composition rule only works for safety assumptions. 
3 The notion of agents, which is used in most works on A/G specifications, naturally disappears in our 
formulation, since in LTL both the assumption and the guarantee are interpreted over a sequence of states 
where the transitions are not labeled, this is similar to the work of [3]. The notion of agents may manifest 
itself as syntactic restrictions on the program statements (or actions) of the system and its environment that 
access their shared variables. For example, a variable may be required to be read-only for the environment. 
Alternatively, agents can be introduced using an auxiliary variable that records the name of the transition 
taken in a step. 
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syntactic definition is possible), to formulate A/G specifications; inference rules are then 
derived by semantic arguments. This in effect is introducing a new operator to the logic. 
There are two main technical problems that arise in using linear-time temporal logic 
for A/G specifications: The first problem is to be able to talk about the satisfaction 
of (the safety part of) a formula with respect to a finite prefix of an infinite sequence 
(temporal formulae in LTL are interpreted over i@zite sequences of states). Barringer 
and Kuiper [6] have pioneered the use of past temporal operators in overcoming the 
problem, while considering particular forms of assumptions and guarantees. Their idea 
intuitively is to regard the end of the prefix as the present and look at the past. We 
observe that Barringer and Kuiper’s idea can be applied to any safety formulae of 
the form OH, where the truth value of H depends only on the present and the past 
states. This brings us to the second problem, which is to extract the safety part, or 
safety closure, of the guarantee part (i.e., the strongest safety property implied by 
the guarantee) in the form of OH. Although this is always possible, the obtained 
formula may be too complicated to reason about. We give a result showing that, if the 
guarantee is specified by a formula in a canonical form that satisfies certain general 
conditions, then its safety closure can be expressed in the desired form and in a more 
succinct way, which greatly facilitates syntactic manipulation. We actually could avoid 
calculating the safety closure, since our formulation of A/G specifications is applicable 
as long as the guarantee is given in the form of 3x: OH A L with H depending only 
on the present and the past states (no other conditions on H or L are required). This 
would be similar to the approach of considering the guarantee as a pair of a safety 
property and an arbitrary supplementary property, e.g. [6, 171. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief and 
informal review of LTL. A canonical form of formulae is defined for expressing 
the assumption and the guarantee of an A/G specification. In Section 3, we show 
that, under some general conditions, the safety closure of a canonical formula can be 
expressed in a very succinct way. Section 4 describes the key ideas of formulating 
A/G specifications in LTL. It also presents derived inference rules for refinement and 
composition. Section 5 enhances the formulation to take into account liveness proper- 
ties in the guarantee part. The composition theorem is contrasted with that of Abadi 
and Lamport. An example is elaborated in Section 6, that demonstrates the simplicity 
of our work. Section 7 is the conclusion. 
2. Preliminaries 
We give a brief and informal introduction to linear-time temporal logic (LTL) as 
defined in [13]. The use of the logic in specifying closed systems is explained, leading 
to the definition of canonical formulae, which naturally arise in writing such speci- 
fications. Canonical formulae are also suitable for expressing the assumption and the 
guarantee of an A/G specification, each of which, when standing alone, is a specifica- 
tion of some closed system. 
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2.1. LTL 
LTL is a logic for expressing properties of infinite sequences of states, where each 
state is an assignment to a predefined universe of variables. An LTL formula is 
interpreted with respect o a position i 2 0 in a sequence of states. We assume a set of 
constant, function, and predicate symbols with fixed interpretations. A state formula is 
a particular LTL formula built only from variables, constants, functions, and predicates 
using the usual first-order logic connectives. The interpretation of a state formula (such 
as “y > 5 A (3n : y = n2 )“) in position i is performed as usual using the particular 
interpretation of variables in state i (plus the fixed interpretations of constants, fkc- 
tions, and predicates). LTL also contains extra temporal operators; in this paper, we 
will use the following: 
_ o means “in the next state”. The formula 0cp is true in position i of a sequence c
(denoted (a,i) b 0~) iff cp is true in position i + 1 of cr (i.e., (a,~’ + 1) b rp). 
- 0 means “always in the future (including the present)“; (a, i) k QJ iff Vk 2 i : 
(ck) I= cp. 
- 0 means “sometime in the future”; (cr, i) k 0 cp iff 3 k b i : (0, k) b q. 
- 6 means “in the previous state, if there is any”; (o,i) k &p iff (i > 0) + 
((5i - 1) F cp). 
- H means “always in the past (including the present)“; (cr, i) k Elcp iff Vk : 0 <k < i : 
(0) k 40. 
- 0 means “sometime in the past”; (a, i) b 0 cp iff 3 k : 0 <k <i : (cr, k) b cp. 
- For a variable u, the interpretation of U- (the previous value of U) in position i 
is the same as the interpretation of variable u in position i - 1; by convention, 
the interpretation of u- in position 0 is the same as the interpretation of u in 
position 0. 4 
- first is an abbreviation for 6false which is true only in position 0. 
We say that a sequence Q satisfies a formula cp (or cp is true for a) if (o,O) + cp, 
which will be abbreviated as g + cp. A formula cp is oalid, denoted k cp (or simply 
cp when it is clear that validity is intended), if cp is satisfied by every sequence. 
Quantification deserves special attention. Each variable is either rigid (having the 
same interpretation in all states of a sequence) or jlexible (with no restrictions on 
interpretation in different states). When specifying a system, flexible variables can 
represent program or control variables, whose value may change over time. For a 
formula 3 u : cp we have (a, i) + 3 u : cp iff there is another sequence (T’, which differs 
from CJ in at most the interpretation given in each state to u, such that (~9, i) k cp; 5 
4 In contrast to Lamport and others who use I‘+” -superscribed (or primed) variables to denote their values in 
the next state, we use “-“-superscribed variables to denote their values in the previous state. The reason is 
that (for conformity) we wish to use only past operators in the safety part of a specification. The introduction 
of “-“-superscribed variables is convenient but not essential, since they can be encoded by the d operator. 
‘We note that, in contrast to TLA advocated by Lamport, the semantics of existential quantification in LTL 
does not preserve invariance under stuttering, i.e., 3 u : tp is not necessarily invariant under stuttering even 
if rp is. However, the composition rules in this paper will still be valid if we adopt the semantics of TLA 
for existential quantification. 
52 B. Jonsson, Y.-K. Tsayl Theoretical Computer Science 167 (1996) 47-72 
note that the restrictions of rigid variables must be observed. Intuitively, this means 
that the truth of 3 u : q for a flexible variable u depends on the existence of an infinite 
sequence of u-values (one for each state), rather than just a single value, such that 9 
can be satisfied. 
A formula without temporal operators but possibly with “-“-superscribed variables 
is called a transition formula (the definition is slightly different from that in [13]). A 
formula without any future operator 0, 0, or 0 is called a past formula; in particular, 
a transition formula is a past formula. A property is said to be a safety property if 
the following condition holds: for any sequence a, if each prefix of a is a prefix of 
some sequence that satisfies the property, then a also satisfies the property. A property 
is said to be a liveness property if every finite sequence is a prefix of some sequence 
that satisfies the property, A safety formula is one that specifies a safety property and 
a Ziueness formula is one that specifies a liveness property. Of particular importance, 
formulae of the form OH are safety formulae if the truth value of H depends only 
on the present and the past states, e.g., if H is a past formula. The form of a liveness 
formula is not important for our purposes. The safety closure of a given property 
is the strongest safety property implied by the given property, i.e., a safety property 
satisfied by exactly those sequences a such that each prefix of a is a prefix of some 
sequence that satisfies the given property. The safety closure of a property specified 
by an arbitrary temporal formula can also be specified by a temporal formula (see the 
next paragraph), making it meaningful to talk about the safety closure of a formula. 
Notations. We use + (instead of -+) for implication. The binding powers of LTL 
operators are ordered according to this grouping - {l,O,O, 0,6,0,0}, (A,V}, 
{ =F, w }, { 3, Y}, in decreasing order; applications of operators with equal binding power 
are associated to the right. Square brackets “[,’ and “I” are sometimes used in place 
of parentheses “(” and “)” for readability. A formula cp is sometimes written as q(n) 
to indicate that the free variables of cp are among the tuple of variables x. We write 
cp[t/u], where t is a state formula and u a variable, to denote the formula obtained from 
40 by simultaneously substituting t for every free occurrence of u, assuming no free 
variables in t become bound in rp; when no confusion may arise, we also use the same 
notation for changing the name of a bound variable or the value of a constant. cp[t/u] 
is simply written as cp[t] if the intended substitution is clear from context. The notation 
for substitutions generalizes to tuples in the obvious way. To avoid ambiguity (since 
there are different but equivalent formulae), the safety closure %Y(cp) of a formula q(x) 
is defined as q [3X: q C@ = x) A ~(jirst A cp[f/x])] (which is satisfied by exactly those 
sequences a such that each prefix of a is a prefix of some sequence that satisfies cp; 
X and x are assumed to be disjoint). 
2.2. Closed systems and canonical formulae 
Using LTL, we can specify the behavior of a closed system [12,16]. Each variable 
of the system is represented by a flexible variable in LTL. Each execution of the system 
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is represented by an infinite sequence of states. The system can thus be specified by an 
LTL formula in the sense that the executions of the system are exactly those satisfying 
the formula. As an example, consider a system with two counters, x and y, that are 
initially 0 and may be incremented from 0 upwards. It can be specified by the LTL 
formula OH,,,,, where 
H count 
x=OAy=O 
( 
x=x-+1riy=y- 
vn=x-Ay=y_+l 
Vx=x_Ay=y_ il 
This formula states that the values of x and y are 0 initially. It also states that each 
step of an execution either increments x, increments y, or does nothing (stutters). 
The above formula does not require any progress; in particular, it allows x and y to 
remain 0 throughout an execution. A progress (liveness) requirement may be added by 
conjoining to q HCOUt a corresponding temporal formula L,,,t which could state, e.g., 
that a computation must contain infinitely many x-incrementing and infinitely many 
y-incrementing steps (see e.g. [ 12,131 for how to write such formulae). Variables can 
be hidden, or made internal, by existential quantification. Therefore, a system like the 
above with only x observable can be specified by 
3 Y : q fL,unt A Lount 
i.e., by existentially quantifying y in the entire specification. This type of quantification 
makes it possible to use abstract representations of the state of a system, which can 
be replaced by more concrete structures in an actual implementation. 
In general, a closed system can be specified by the conjunction of a safety formula 
and a liveness formula. The safety formula can be put in the form of OH with H 
being a past formula, particularly q l((jrst + Znit) A (+st =+ N)), where Znit is a 
state formula and N a transition formula, as in the previous example. The exact form 
of the liveness formula is not important for our purposes. Existential quantifications 
may be introduced to hide internal variables. Thus, a complete specification can be put 
into the form 
where x is a tuple of flexible variables, H is a past formula (so that OH is a safety 
formula), and L is a liveness formula. Formulae of this form are called canonical 
formulae; the condition that H is a past formula will be relaxed in the next subsection. 
As we will show in Section 3, it is desirable that the pair of OH and L be 
“machine-closed” [l], i.e., %(OH A L) + q IH; this condition can always be enforced 
as shown in the next subsection. One way of understanding machine-closedness i  
that L does not rule out safety properties that are allowed by OH. For example, 
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“O[O(x = 0) vEI(x = l)]” (which equals “0(x = 0) VO(x = 1)“) and “0 0(x = 1)” 
is not machine-closed, since 0 0 (x = 1) rules out the possibility of 0(x = 0). 
2.3. Generalized canonical formulae 
We have required H in a canonical formula “3x: OH A L” to be a past formula so 
that the truth value of H depends only on the present and the past states and thus OH is 
a safety formula. The requirement can be replaced by a more general but less practical 
one, since the fact that “the truth value of a formula cp depends only on the present 
and the past states” can be precisely expressed as “O[El(x = y) + (cp[x] H cp[r])] 
is valid”. A formula that meets the more general requirement is called a historical 
(or semantically past) formula. 6 Obviously, every past formula is historical. From the 
definition of a historical formula it follows that, if H is historical, then OH specifies 
a safety property and thus is a safety formula. The defining formula for %‘(cp), for 
instance, is in this form. 
Once H is generalized to be historical, the desirable condition of machine-closedness 
- W(OH AL) H q IH, can always be enforced (at least in theory). In fact, any formula 
cp is equivalent to the formula %(cp) A (-%‘(cp) V cp), which is in the form of q IH, AL, 
with Hq being a historical formula and L, a liveness formula such that V(UH,AL,) ($ 
OH,. (This is analogous to the well-known result that every property is the conjunction 
of a safety property and a liveness property [5].) We may also apply the result to cp 
in the context of a specification of a closed system 3x: cp, translating the specification 
into another canonical formula that satisfies the machine-closedness condition. 
3. Calculating safety closures 
Crucial to our formulation of A/G specifications is succinct expression of the safety 
closure of a canonical formula; the defining formula for safety closures presented in 
Section 2.1 is too complicated to work with. In this section, we define the stuttering- 
extensibility of a safety formula and show that, under machine-closedness and stutter- 
ing-extensibility, the safety closure of a canonical formula can be expressed in a suc- 
cinct way and in the desired form. 
First, we adapt a result in [3, Lemma 81 to state that the safety closure of a canonical 
formula 3x: OHAL equals the safety closure of 3x: OH, under the machine-closedness 
assumption @(OH AL) % OH: 
Lemma 1. Zf 3x: OH AL is a canonical formula such that V(OH A L) @ OH, then 
%(3x: OH AL) M %(3x: OH). 
Note that 3x : OH may or may not be a safety formula; even if it is, the formula 
is not in the desired form of q IH’ such that H’ is past or historical. For example, 
6 The definition of historical formulae is due to Amir Pnueli. 
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3x: q [(jirst * (y = O))A(1jirst =+ (x- >OAx =x--1Ay = y-+l)V(x =x-Ay = 
y- ))] is not a safety formula. Because, a sequence o in which y is incremented 
indefinitely does not satisfy the formula, while each prefix of cr is a prefix of some 
sequence that does. 
Let O]i denote the prefix of CJ (= SO,S~,S~,... ) of length i, i.e., the finite sequence 
ss,st, . . . ,si (which contains i + 1 states and i transitions). The stuttering-extension of 
oli is the infinite sequence obtained from O]i by indefinitely repeating its last state 
Si, i.e., the infinite sequence SO, st , . . ., si_1, si, si, si, . . . . We say that a safety 
formula OH (with H being a past or historical formula) is stuttering-extensible if 
the following condition holds: for every o and every i 20, if IIH is true at posi- 
tion i of CJ, then q IH is true for the stuttering-extension of Cli. Equivalently, OH 
is stuttering-extensible if q [BH(w) + 3G : Ei(G = w) A OO(fi = G-) A o(jirst A 
q !H[G/w]) is valid. The intuition is that, if a system has satisfied a stuttering-extensible 
safety property so far, then it will continue to satisfy the safety property simply 
by doing nothing. We note that stuttering-extensibility is conjunctive in the sense 
that the conjunction of two stuttering-extensible formulae is also stuttering- 
extensible. 
We next show that, if OH is stuttering-extensible, then the safety closure of 3x: OH 
is simply 0(3x: q H): 
Lemma 2. Zf 3x: q H is a canonicaf formula such that OH is stuttering-extensible, 
then %?(3x: OH) w 0(3x: q H). 
Proof. We write H as H(x,z) to indicate that the free variables of H are either in 
x or z, where x and z are disjoint. V(3x : q H(x,z)) by definition equals q [32 : 
El(Z = z) A o(jr.st A (3x : q H[x,Z]))], which can be rewritten as q [3x32 : W(2 = 
z) A O(jirst A q H[x,.F])]. To prove the lemma, it suffices to show the vali- 
dity of 
q [(3x3Z : q (Z = z) A o($rst A q Hex,.?))) es 3x: ElH(x,z)]. 
The + direction follows from the fact that the truth values of H and EIH depend only 
on the present and the past states, which implies the validity of a stronger formula 
q [(32 : ‘El@ = z) A O($rst A q Hex,.?))) =+ q H(x,z)]. 
For the S= direction, we proceed as follows: 
/= q [(3x: ElH(x,z)) + 3x35 : q (Z = z) A 0 (jirst A q H(x,F))] 
+= {OH(x,z) i s stuttering-extensible} 
q H[z?,.F])) + 3x3,? : Ei(Z = z) A 0 (Jirst A q lH(x,~))] 
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-e== j= q [(3_zZ : El@ = 2) A O(jrst A clH[f,z])) 
* 3x3.5 : El(Z = z) A 0 (first A q H(_Q))] 
The validity of the last formula is clear. 0 
A weaker condition than stuttering-extensibility is sufficient for the above lemma to 
hold, since we did not need the conjunct 0 q (f = Z- A,? = F ) in the proof. However, 
the weaker condition lacks the conjunctivity property enjoyed by stuttering-extensibility. 
From Lemmas 1 and 2, a theorem follows. 
Theorem 3. If 3x : OH A L is a canonical formula such that GfT(OH A L) @ OH and 
OH is stuttering-extensible, then %7(3x : OH A L) w 0(3x: q H). 
4. Assumption/guarantee specifications 
In this and the next sections, we describe a formulation of A/G specifications in 
LTL that conforms to the interpretation of Misra and Chandy and others introduced in 
Section 1. Inference rules for refining and composing such specifications are derived; 
omitted proofs can be found in Appendix A. In light of the results in Section 3, we con- 
sider A/G specifications where the assumption and the guarantee parts are expressed in 
the canonical form with the additional conditions of machine-closedness and stuttering- 
extensibility: 
(i) The assumption E is expressed as 0(3x: ElHs). As we have shown previously, 
assuming that q HE is stuttering-extensible, 0(3x: EIHE) expresses the safety closure 
of 3x : q HE, which is a specification of the safety properties of a system with the 
tuple x of internal variables hidden. Recall that 3x : q HE is not necessarily a safety 
formula. 
(ii) The guarantee M is expressed as 3 y : OHM A LM where V(OHM A LM) * OHM 
and OHM is stuttering-extensible so that the safety closure of M is equivalent o 
q (3y: q HM). 
If no internal variables are used, E becomes q OHE, or simply q HE, while the safety 
closure of M becomes OHM. 
In fact, the conditions of machine-closedness and stuttering-extensibility are not 
absolutely necessary. The derived inference rules will still be valid without the two 
conditions if we regard the guarantee M as a pair of the safety formula q (3y: OHM) 
and some supplementary formula and interpret he definition of D (Section 5) as a 
purely syntactical expansion. 
4.1. Basic formulation 
Following Misra and Chandy [14], an A/G specification of a system should capture 
the following property: For every execution of the system, the guarantee M is satisfied 
initially and, for every i 2 1, if the assumption E has been satisfied by the prefix of 
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length i - 1, then M is satisfied by the prefix of length i (recall that the length of an 
execution is the number of transitions, which is one less than the number of states in 
the execution). The satisfaction of a formula with respect o prefixes of an execution 
depends only the safety part of the formula (since each of the prefixes is finite and 
therefore, by definition, can be extended to an infinite execution satisfying the liveness 
part of the formula). Therefore, we first concentrate on the safety closure of E (which 
is E itself) and that of M; the liveness part of M will be taken into account in the 
next section. In other words, we consider the formulation of an A/G specification with 
assumption 0(3x: i3H~) and guarantee q(3y: E~HM). 
Since HE and HM (and hence 3x: EIHE and 3y: E~HM) are historical, “0(3x: EIHE) 
is satisfied by the prefix of length i - 1 of CT” can be formally stated as “(o,i) k 
&3(3x : EIHE)” or equivalently “(o,i) k 6(3 x : E!HE)” (recall that the states of c 
are numbered from 0) and “O(3y: EIHM) is satisfied by the prefix of length i of a” 
as “(0, i) + (3y : !ZIHM)“. The property that we intended to capture can, therefore, 
be expressed as q [6(3x : EIHE) + (3y : EIHM)]. This formula also implies that 
(3y : EiHM), or simply (3y : HM), has to be satisfied initially, since 6(3x : q HE) 
always holds in the initial state. 
In summary, we take q [6(3x : q HE) + (3y : IIHM)] to be the A/G specification 
with assumption 0(3x: ITHE) and guarantee ql(3y: EIHM). We now proceed to derive 
inference rules for refining and composing such specifications. 
4.2. Simple compositions of A/G specijications 
The following lemma states that A/G specifications can be composed in a straight- 
forward way. 
Lemma 4 (Simple composition). Assuming that XI,. . . ,x,,, yi, . . . , yn are pairwise dis- 
joint and no free variables become bound, 
AO[@%: THE) + (3yi: ElHM*)] 
i=l 
1 . ..x..L$HE, 
i=l 
From Lemma 4 and a simple induction, we obtain 
Theorem 5. 
A special case of the theorem is the composition principle essentially formulated by 
Misra and Chandy: 
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4.3. Rejinement rules 
We wish to find out when an A/G specification is refined by another. We do so 
by deriving two inference rules: one for refining the assumption and the other for 
the guarantee. As in, e.g., [12, 161, we adopt implication + as the refinement relation 
between two specifications. The refinement relation between two A/G specifications 
with a fixed assumption may be proven using the following rule. 
Theorem 6 (Refinement of guarantee). 
q [6(3x: El&) A (3y’: El&P) =+ (3y: OHM)] 
q [6(3x: q HE) =+ (3y’: El&~)] =+ q [6(3x: El&) * (3y: q ff“)l 
Since q (3y’ : W&ff) trivially implies [7[&3x: THE) * (3~‘: l3H,1)], a simple 
corollary follows. 
Corollary 7. 
q [@x: OH-) A (3y’: wi5p) =+ (3y: m&4)1 
q (3y’: EIHM!) =+ q [d(3x: El&) + (3.y: m&V)1 
Corollary 7 can be used to show that an unconditional specification refines (imple- 
ments) an A/G specification. (The case where an unconditional specification refines 
another is proven in the usual way [l].) 
Refinement between two A/G specifications with a fixed guarantee may be proven 
using the following rule. 
Theorem 8 (Refinement of assumption). 
cl[(3x: El&) A (3y: q HM) =+ (3x’: El&‘)] 
q [@3x’: El&‘) =+ (3y: q HM)] + q [(3(3x: El&) =+ (3y:El&)l 
4.4. General composition rule 
We now apply Theorems 6 and 8 to prove a fundamental theorem on the composition 
of A/G specifications in a general situation. In the next section, we will generalize the 
result to include liveness. 
Theorem 9. Assuming that x, y, XI,. . . ,x,,, yi,. . . , y,, are pairwise disjoint and no free 
variables become bound, 
3yi...y,:&& 1 . ..x”.oi;z& 
i=l i=l >I 
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Intuitively, Premise 1 of the above composition rule says that the assumption about the 
environment of a module should follow from the guarantees of other modules and the 
assumption about the environment of the entire system; while, Premise 2 says that the 
guarantee of the entire system should follow from the guarantees of individual modules 
and the assumption about its environment. 
Proof. 
* {Lemma 4) 
0 6 
[ ( 
3x1 . ..xn.O/;\HE, =+ 3Yl . ..y.:o;iH~, 
i=l > ( i=l I + {Premise 1 and Theorem 8) 
0 
[ 
d(3r:~HE) + 3yl . ..yn.m;iHM2 
( i=l 
+ {Premise 2 and Theorem 6) 
q [6(3n: q HE) =+ (3~: q HM)] 0 
5. Adding liveness 
We have concentrated on specifications of the form “0[6(3x : q HE) + (3 y : 
q HM)]“, presenting inference rules for refining and composing such specifications. 
To allow liveness properties in the guarantee, we simply strengthen the specifica- 
tion by conjoining it with the usual implication between the assumption and the en- 
tire guarantee. As the complete formulation of an A/G specification with assump- 
tion E = 0(3x : q HE) and guarantee it4 E 3y : OHM A LM, we define E D A4 as 
follows: 
EDM 5 q [6(3x:RH~)~(3y:~H~)]~[E=Of] 
This is consistent with our taking “O[Cj@x: q HE) + (3~: OHM)]” to be the A/G 
specification with assumption 0(3x : q HE) and guarantee q (3 y : OHM) in the previous 
section, since if M is a safety formula, the implication E + A4 will be subsumed by 
q [@x: q HE) =+ (3~: i3HM)]. 
Lemma 10. 
q [6(3x: q HE) =+ (3~: q H,+,)] =+ [0(3x: q HE) =+ WY: q Hw)l. 
Therefore, 
[0(3x: NHE) DO(3y: RHM)] M q [6(3x: THE) =+- (3~: q HM)I. 
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We can now formulate a more complete composition theorem as follows. 
Theorem 11. Assuming that x, y, xl,. . . ,x,, yl,. . . , y,, are pairwise disjoint and no 
free variables become bound, 
1. 3y1 3x1 . ..xn.O;iHE, 
i=l I 
2. (a) 0 
[ 
6(3x:OHE)A 3yl...y,:lLi~H~z 
i=l > 
+ (3y:BHM) 1 
(b) E A AMi + M 
i=l 
i(Ei DMi) + (E DM) 
i=l 
Proof. By the definition of E DM, we need to prove from the premises that /$,(Ei D 
Mi) implies 
q [6(3x: OHE) + (3~: q HM)] A [E =+ M]. 
The first conjunct follows from Theorem 9. To prove that E + M, it suffices (by 
Premise 2(b)) to prove that E + r\y=, Mi. SO, we assume A~=,(& D Mi) A E and 
proceed as follows: 
i(Ei DMi)AE 
i=l 
=S {definition of D and E = 0(3x : q HE)} 
i(Ei*Mi)A jtU[~(~xi:~H~i)~(3yi:~H~~)]A0(3x:OHE) 
i=l i=l 
=k- {similar to the first two steps of the proof of Theorem 9) 
=k- {Lemma IO} 
i(Ei*Mi)A[0(3x:OHE)+O !Iyl...y,:miH~~ ]ACI(~X:OHE) 
i=l i=l > 
+ {Modus Ponens} 
i(Ei+Mi)A0(3x:OHE)AO !Iyl...yn:mhH~, 
i=l ( i=l > 
+ {Premise 1, q (p + q) =+ (Up + q q), and q is conjunctive} 
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i;(Ei +Mi)AO 3X1...X,:O;iHE, 
i=l ( i=l > 
+ (0 and 0 are conjunctive and xi, 1 <i<n, are pairwise disjoint} 
;i(Ei * A4i) A jjG(3xi: EIHE) 
i=l i=l 
+ {Modus Ponens and Ei E q (3xi : WOE,))) 
We turn to the question of how one goes about establishing the premises of the 
presented inference rules. We may concentrate on Theorem 11, since this rule com- 
prises the principles embodied in Theorems 6, 8, and 9. Premise 2(b) is in the usual 
form of refinement between two canonical formulae, which can be proven by standard 
“refinement mapping” techniques [12, 161. Premises 1 and 2(a) can, respectively, be 
rewritten as follows: 
(i) q I[OHE AC~~\~,HM~ + 3x1 . . .x, :O&HE,] 
(ii) q [&3H~ A~I\~=,HM~ + 3~: OHM] 
Both formulae are in a weaker form than the usual refinement between two canonical 
formulae, because the existential quantifications occur inside the 0 operator. Like in 
the usual case, we may find appropriate functions fl , . . , fn, g that map from the free 
variables of HE, HM, , . . . , HM” to the domains of xl,. . . ,x,,, y respectively, and prove the 
following: 
(i) •[~HE A~/I~=~HM * q l\~~~H~,[fi/xill 
(ii) q [6)oH~ A •l\y=,H~~ + ElHM[g/y]] 
The first premise can be proven by showing 
q HE A AHM, * ~HE,[hhl . 
i=l i=l 1 
The second premise needs more work. We have 
I= 0 [GOHE AH~~HM~ * q Kdslyl] 
l36mH~ A~~HM, =s-mHM[g/y] 
i=l I 
where 1~ is a state formula such that q @HE + f&7), whose validity can be established 
by the usual proof of an invariant. Let Ii denote the transition formula obtained from 
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I= by superscribing every flexible variable with “-“. It follows that the second premise 
can be proven by showing 
It is sometimes possible, e.g., in the example of Section 6, to prove a stronger and 
simpler formula q (A~=iZ&, * Z&[g/y]). 
Comparison with Ahadi and Lamport’s work. In [3], Abadi and Lamport further de- 
velop their earlier work on A/G specifications [2] using the framework of TLA [12]. 
Although they have also used temporal ogic as the basis, their approach is different 
from ours. Whereas we express and reason about A/G specifications syntactically, they 
work mostly at the semantic level. Technically, due to the absence of past operators 
in TLA, they extend the semantic model for TLA formulae to include finite sequences 
so that the assertion “a finite prefix of an execution satisfies a formula” (which plays 
a central role in A/G specifications) can be stated directly, which otherwise would 
require extensive usage of auxiliary variables that result in long and complicated 
formulae. 7
Abadi and Lamport formulate an A/G specification by means of the operator %. 
They define the formula E % M to be true of a behavior cr iff (a) E + M is true 
of o’, (b) M holds initially, and (c) for every n B 0, if E holds for the prefix of (T of 
length n, then A4 holds for the prefix of o of length n + 1. Part (a) is also present 
in our formulation of E D M. Parts (b) and (c) presuppose a definition of when a 
formula is satisfied by a prefix of a behavior; the definition of satisfaction by Abadi 
and Lamport depends only on the safety closure of a formula (i.e., parts (b) and (c) 
can be equivalently formulated using the safety closures V(E) and g(M) of E and 
M). Consequently, their general composition theorem, shown below, makes extensive 
use of safety closures: 
1. g(E) A j(%‘(Mi) + AEi 
i=l i=l 
(b) E A AMi +M 
i=l 
i(Ei%Mi)+(EkM) 
i=l 
7 In TLA, the safety closure of a formula q(x) would be expressed as “W : (b = 1 A q (b’ = 0 V b’ = 
b)Aov(b’ = 0)) =s (3 y: o(b = 1 + x = y)~q[y/x])“. Other definitions for formulating A/G specifications 
would also be complicated. 
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where 9?(E)+,, for some tuple u of variables, intuitively means that the values of v 
may change in a state transition only if the prefix up to the current state satisfies V(E). 
Aside from using the novel (and not very easy to reason about) operator “+v”, the 
theorem explicitly uses safety closures, which are a semantic notion. In contrast, our 
composition theorem is presented purely syntactically within LTL. It can be shown 
that, under some general assumptions, the composition theorem of Abadi and Lamport 
can be derived from Theorem 11; details are provided in Appendix B. 
6. An example 
To illustrate the application of our formulation of A/G specifications, we consider 
the same example as used by Abadi and Lamport [3] and others, e.g., [6,7], where 
two queues for storing natural numbers are composed in series to obtain a larger 
one. A queue is an open system whose environment is the user of the queue. In 
the most straightforward A/G specification of a queue, the guarantee part contains 
an internal variable that is used to store a finite sequence of natural numbers. To 
make the example more interesting, we stipulate that numbers are sent by the en- 
vironment in ascending order. We deliberately introduce an internal variable (which 
could have been avoided) in the assumption part that stores the next number to 
be sent by the environment o the queue and we specify that the next number be 
greater than the previous one sent. It should be noted that internal variables are of- 
ten introduced for the ease of writing specifications and need not correspond to ac- 
tual program variables in an implementation. We take the liberty to borrow notions 
from [3] for our exposition of the example. We shall concentrate only on safety 
properties; liveness properties can be handled in a similar way as in [3]. More- 
over, we shall adopt a noninterleaving representation of the queue, permitting the 
addition of a number to and the removal of another from the queue to occur si- 
multaneously; an interleaving representation can also be treated in a similar way as 
in [3]. 
A queue interacts with its environment via two single-buffered channels: an input 
channel for receiving a number from the environment and an output channel for sending 
a number to the environment, as depicted in Fig. 1. A channel c consists of two 
variables c.sig and c.ack of type boolean and a third variable (the single buffer) c.uaZ of 
type natural number. Boolean variables c. sig and c. ack are used for the synchronization 
between the sender and the receiver of channel c. The channel is ready for sending 
iff c.sig = c.ack. When c.sig = c.ack, the sender may deposit a number in c.val 
and at the same time negate the value of c.sig so that c.sig # c.ack, indicating that 
a value has been sent. Subsequently, the receiver may read the value of c.val and 
negate c.ack, which makes c.sig and c.ack equal indicating that the channel is ready 
for sending again. This synchronization mechanism is usually referred to as the (two- 
phase) handshake protocol. We write c to denote (c.sig, c.ack, c.val) and c.snd to denote 
(c.sig, c.val). 
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fq-L--j~ 
Fig. 1. A queue as an open system. 
We introduce abbreviations for the initial condition and two relevant transition for- 
mulae on a channel: 
Chit(c) b -z.sig A lc.ack A c.val = 0 
Send(v,c) A c.sig- = c.ack- A c.ack = c.ack- A cmd = (-z.sig-, v) 
Ack(c) a c.sig- # c.ack- A c.ack = Tc.ack- A c.snd = c.snd- 
In accordance with the handshake protocol, the environment of a queue with input 
channel i and output channel o is expected to obey the following assumption: 
A 
E(i,o,x) = q (3x: q HE(i,o,x)) 
HE(i,o,x) a (jirst + ZnitE) A (+irst + (Put V Get V GetPut V Sk&)) 
where the initial condition and relevant transition formulae are defined as 
follows: s 
ZnitE A CZnit(i) 
Put A Send@-, i) A x > x- A o.ack = o.ack- 
Get A Ack(o) A i.snd = i.snd- A x = x- 
GetPut a Ack(o) A Send(x-, i) A x > x- 
Skip, A i.snd = i.snd- A o.ack = o.ack- Ax = x- 
The queue in return should guarantee M as defined below: 
M(i,o,q,max) a 0 (3q: W&(i,o,q,max)) 
A 
HM(i,o,q,max) = (Jirst + hit&A 
(+irst + (Enq V Deq V DeqEnq V Skip,)) 
8 We in fact have “overspecifiefl the assumption about the environment, as we not only state that the 
numbers sent are ascending but we also state that the next number is determined once the current one is 
sent. 
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isnd m.snd o.snd 
* 
Queue1 
. 
Queue2 
i. ack (size Nr) m. ack (size Ns) o.ack - . . 
Fig. 2. Implementation of a queue by two composed in series. 
where the relevant formulae are defined as follows: 
InitM b Chit(o) A q = () 
Enq a (q-1 < max A Ack(i) A (q = q- o (i.uuf-)) A o.snd = osnd- 
Deq k lq- 1 > 0 A Send(head(q-),o) A q = tuil(q-) A Lack = i.ack- 
DeqEnq A /q-l > 0 A Send(heud(q-),o) A Ack(i)A 
(q = taiZ(q-) 0 (i.ual-)) 
Skip, 2 osnd = o.snd- A i.uck = i.uck- A q = q- 
Note that HE and HM are indeed past and hence historical formulae as required. 
Both q HE and OHM are apparently stuttering-extensible. From Theorem 3, 0(3x : 
q HE(i,o,x)) and q (Zlq:‘UH~(i,o,q,mux)) express the safety closures of 3x : 
q HE(i, 0,x) and 3q: q HM(i, o,q,mux), respectively. 
The assertion that the composition of two queues in series results in a larger one can 
be expressed by the following formula (recall that E[i,m,nl] abbreviates E[i/i,m/o,xl/x]; 
analogously for other abbreviations): 
Wkm,xll DMi,m,ql,NI) A (E[mw~l D~[wo,qdhl) 
* tE[i,o,xl DMi,o,q,(W +N + 111) 
Fig. 2 shows the statement in picture. 
We now apply Theorem 9 to show the validity of the above statement. Following 
the discussion in Section 5, the premises of the theorem translate into the following 
two formulae: 
* 3x1~2: Wfdi,m,xll AK4~,~,~21)1 
(ii) q dOHdi,wl ~Wh[i,~,q~,Wl AHidwo,qdW 
+ 3q: L3HM[i,o,q,(Nl +A$ + l)]] 
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The required mappings can be defined as follows: 
(i) For variable xi, the required mapping Xi is simply Xi(x) = x. For variable x2, 
we define the mapping & as follows: 
xZ(X,i,ql) A he@ql) if 41 # 0 
i.val if q1 = () A i&g # Lack 
X otherwise 
Intuitively, for the second queue, the next number to be sent by its environment is 
either the value at the head of q1 (if not empty), i.val (if q1 is empty and channel i
not empty), or x. 
(ii) The mapping from 41, m, and q2 to q is the same as in [3]: 
A 
4(41,m,q2) = q2oq1 if m.sig = m.ack 
q2 0 (m.v4 0 41 otherwise 
Using these mappings, it is straightforward to prove 
(i) WMi,o,Xl ~M~[i,mq~,Nl AHbfho,q2,~21) 
* fMi,m,%l A fMm,o,f211 
(ii> Wh4[i,m,qbNl ~Hdm,o,q2,~21 * fMi,~,~,Wl +N2 + 1111 
which implies the needed premises. 
7. Conclusion 
We have developed a formulation of A/G specifications within linear-time temporal 
logic, along with a set of derived refinement and composition rules. We have shown 
that, by using past temporal operators, it is possible to give a natural and general 
formulation of A/G specifications and to derive needed inference rules in a simple and 
straightforward way. We have also shown how internal variables can be handled. It is 
our intention that the results will further advance the use and applicability of temporal 
logic in specifying concurrent systems. 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
This section provides proofs that were omitted from the main text. 
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Proof of Lemma 4. 
Proof of Theorem 5. We assume without loss of generality that yi and y2 are disjoint. 
From the antecedent and Lemma 4, we obtain 
The consequence can be rewritten as 0 (3 yiy2 : L3(HM, A HM2)). The Theorem then 
follows immediately from the validity of q (6)p =S p) + Op. 0 
Proof of Theorem 6. 
+ q [Q(3x: q HE) A (3~‘: ElHw) + (3~: q H,w)] 
+ {p A q + r implies (p =k q) =S (p =+ 7)) 
+ q [[6(3x: q HE) =+- (3~‘: EIHM~)] =+ [6(3x: q HE) * (3~: OHM)]] 
+ {distributing 0 over =+-} 
+ q [6(3x: EIHE) =+ (3~‘: EIHMO] + [7[6(3x: EIHE) * (3~: EIHw)] C 
Proof of Theorem 8. For brevity, we write (3x : EIHE) as 3E!Hs, (3y : E~HM) as 
3EiHM, and (3x’ : E!HEt) as 3flHsr. It suffices to prove the validity of the following 
formula: 
q (3ElHE A 3EtHM =+ 3ElHEt) A q (6El3HE, + 313HM) =+ q (63ElHE =+ 3ElHM) 
Let ip A q (3l3Hs A 3i3H~ + 3mHs1). According to the induction principle, we break 
the formula into the conjunction of two formulae that correspond to the base case 
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and the induction step 
@ A q (63El& =+ 3ElHM) * q [(63ElHE =+ 3ElHM) =+ O(d3ElHE * 3EHM)] 
which is equivalent to 
Proof of Lemma 10. 
q [6(3n: IFHE) =+ (3y: OHM)] 
+ {CI[(3x: ElIYE) =+-6(3x: EM&)] is valid} 
q [(3x: El&) =2 (3y: q H,)] 
* [0(3x: lx&) + q (3y: EM&)] 0 
Appendix B. Comparison with the work of Abadi and Lamport 
In this section, we give a more detailed account of Abadi and Lamport’s work [3] 
and draw comparison between their work and ours. We will make necessary assump- 
tions so that the two f rmulations may be compared directly. In particular, we show 
that under these assumptions their composition theorem can be derived from ours. 
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We use the terms “formula” and “property” interchangeably, assuming every prop- 
erty under consideration is expressible in temporal ogic. We assume that every TLA 
formula is appropriately translated into its equivalent representation i LTL so that 
we need only to talk about formulae in one single temporal ogic LTL. Specifically, 
in TLA the safety part of a system is usually specified by a formula of the form 
Znit A ON, where Znit is a state predicate and N an action. The TLA formula is 
equivalently translated into an LTL formula q ((jirst + Znit) A ($rst + N’)), where 
N’ is a transition formula corresponding to N. There is a subtle difference between 
LTL and TLA in their interpretations of existential quantifications over flexible vari- 
ables. In the semantics of TLA, the interpretation of an existentially quantified formula 
is such that it is invariant under stuttering. For the sake of making comparison, we 
assume that the “equivalent” translation of an existentially quantified TLA formula un- 
der consideration is indeed invariant under stuttering even according to the semantics 
of LTL. 
We first cover some preliminaries: A finite sequence is said to satisfy a formula 
if the sequence can be extended to an infinite one that satisfies the formula. For- 
mally, 01” kti cp denotes that there exists an infinite sequence o’, where cr’ln = oln, 
such that o’ + cp. 9 We equate cr kw cp with cr + cp for any infinite sequence 0. 
It is easy to see that a formula is valid when interpreted over finite and infinite 
sequences if and only if it is valid when interpreted over only infinite sequences; 
hence, one notion of validity suffices. In accordance with the extended semantics 
of formulae, the definition of a safety property can be alternatively stated as fol- 
lows: the property is satisfied by an infinite sequence o iff it is satisfied by every 
prefix of o. From the definition of a safety closure, o /= g(cp) iff crJ,, kU cp for 
every n. 
Abadi and Lamport formulate an A/G specification by means of the operator a 
defined as follows: The formula E a M is true of a behavior CJ iff (a) E =+ A4 
is true of 0, i.e., cr k=w E + M, (b) A4 holds for 610 (the first state of B), i.e., 
crja kU M, and (c) for every n>O, if E holds for oln, then M holds for &+t, i.e., 
(4 t==o E) =+ (dn+l kc0 w. s ince a formula holds for a finite sequence iff its safety 
closure holds for the sequence, conditions (b) and (c) can be restated as follows: 
V(M) holds for cr[o and, for every n 20, if V(E) holds for ol,, then %7(M) holds 
for oI,+t. It turns out that conditions (b) and (c) imply V(E) +- 5%‘(M) and hence 
are equivalent o V(E) a G&M). Consequently, we have (E a M) ti (E +- M) A 
(w(E) k WW). 
We assume for simplicity that E and M are given, respectively, as generalized 
canonical formulae CIHE and q IZZM ALM such that the latter is machine-closed (which 
can always be done as indicated in Section 2.3). We also assume that q HE and q HM 
are stuttering-extensible; this assumption is always met by TLA specifications. Since 
9 Interpreting formulae over finite sequences sometimes can be confusing. In particular, 61” /=W p + 4 
means that 3~‘: (0’1~ = al,) A (a’ + p =S q), which is not the same as (aIn /=:o p) =+ (~1” kW q). The 
definition of E k M in the subsequent paragraph, however, has the flavor of the latter interpretation. 
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both formulations contain E + M, to compare E a M and E DM, we may concentrate 
on Cl& % q HM and tl(6E!HE + HHM). 
Lemma B.1. Assume that HE and HM are historical formulae. 
1. If OHM is stuttering-extensible, then q (6l3H~ =+ l3H~) + (CIHE % OHM). 
2. IfclH~ is stuttering-extensible, then @HE -k OHM) =+ q (6lZiH~ 3 OHM). 
Proof. We first observe that both q l(6)oH~ + f3H~) and q HE a OHM imply that 
HM holds initially. For Case 1, we further note that, since OHM is stuttering-extensible, 
~1s I=0 OH, if HM holds in the initial state of (T. 
1. Consider an arbitrary infinite sequence (T such that d + q (XIHE + OHM) 
and, for some n>O, ~1, k. tlH~. We need to show that rrln+i b=. OHM. As HE is 
historical, we infer that (o,n) k q HE or equivalently (a,n + 1) k GOHE; whence 
(o,n + 1) + i3H~ (due to q (6joH~ =S q H,+J)). Since, OHM is stuttering-extensible 
and (o,n + 1) + ILIHM, we conclude that gin+1 b. OHM. 
2. Consider (T such that rr k q HE k OHM and, for some n20, (a,n + 1) + 
6mH~ or equivalently (a,n) + q HE. We need to show (a,n + 1) b OHM. Since 
q HE is stuttering-extensible, we see that (~1, k=. q HE. Together with q HE % OHM, 
it follows that c$+t k. OH M. Since HM is historical, we conclude that (cr, n + 1) 
+BHM. 0 
Abadi and Lamport present a general composition theorem as follows: lo 
1. 
2. (a) 
(b) 
q(E) A j(W(Mi) + AEi 
i=l i=l 
q(E)+” A A%(M) * w(M) 
i=l 
EAiMi+M 
i=l 
i(Ei % Mi) + (E % M) 
i=l 
The meaning of W(E)+,, where 21 is a tuple of variables, is defined as follows: A 
sequence 0 satisfies W(E)+, if and only if, whenever rrln k:. W(E) for any n, the 
values of u in 0 remain the same from the nth state on. The above theorem holds for 
an arbitrary ZI. 
Aside from using the novel (and not very easy to reason about) operator “+““, 
the theorem explicitly uses safety closures, which are a semantic notion. In contrast, 
our composition theorem is presented purely syntactically within LTL. Recall that for 
lo For readers who are familiar with Abadi and Lamport’s earlier work [2], it may be interesting to note that 
Premise 2(a) is weaker than its counterpart in the earlier version of the theorem, which makes the entire 
theorem stronger. 
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making comparison we have assumed that E = q HE and M E OHM A LM. Sim- 
ilarly, we assume Ei E q HE, and A4i E q HM; A LM,, 1 <i <n. The conditions of 
machine-closedness and stuttering-extensibility are also assumed. Abadi and Lamport’s 
composition theorem can be restated as below. 
1. q HEAO;iHM, +OhHE, 
i=l i=l 
2. (a> tufb)+, Au A&, * WV 
i=l 
(b) E A AMi +M 
i=l 
i(Ei %Mi) + (E%M) 
i=l 
While, our composition theorem becomes: 
1. 0 +Oj;HE, 
i=l 1 
2. (a) 0 
[ 
baHE ~i3 ;iHMi + q H, 
i=l 1 
(b) E A AMi + M 
i=l 
i(Ei DMi) + (E DM) 
i=l 
From Lemma B. 1, the conclusions of the two theorems are equivalent. To show that 
Abadi and Lamport’s theorem can be derived from ours, it remains to show that each of 
the premises in the former theorem implies the corresponding one in the latter. This is 
proven by the following two lemmas (recall that stuttering-extensibility is conjunctive): 
Lemma B.2. Assume that HI and HZ are historical formulae and OH1 is stuttering- 
extensible. If OHI + q H2 is valid, then q (iZlH~ + q HZ) is also valid. 
Proof. Consider an arbitrary sequence 0. Assuming, for some n 20, (a,n) + f?lH~, we 
need to show that (a, n) /== LIlH2. From (cr, n) k IIlHl and the hypothesis that HI is 
historical and OHI is stuttering-extensible, it follows that c$, kU OHl. Therefore, for 
some extension cr’ of gin, we have cr’ b OHI and, from the validity of OHI + q !H2, 
it follows that g’ b q lH2. As HZ is historical, Q’ b OH;! and o!l,, = c$, implies 
(a,n) b q H2. 0 
Lemma B.3. Assume that HE, HMI, and HM are historical formulae and q !H,t is 
stuttering-extensible. If @HE)+, AOHM! + OHM is valid, then q [60H~ r\mH~t + 
OHM] is also valid 
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary sequence o. Assuming, for some n 20, (cr, n) + ~EIHE A 
q HMI, we need to show that (o,n) + EIHM. Let c’ be the stuttering-extension of r&. 
Since (a,n) k 60H~ and HE is historical, IZ is the earliest possible position such that 
o’ln kW q HE. If (~‘1, k& q HE, then from the definition of “(THE)+,” and that the 
states of cr’ remain the same from position n, we have o’ + (OHE),,; otherwise, we 
have (~‘1, kW q HE and hence cr’ + IJHE which trivially implies G’ + (OHE)+,. From 
(cr, n) k q HMI and the stuttering-extensibility of OHM,, we have (r’ + OHM,. Now 
that cr.’ b (OHE)+, AOHM,, from the validity of @HE)+, A q HM! + OHM, it follows 
that ri’ + OHM, which implies (o,n) + E!HM. 0 
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